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Objectivity  and  the  Supernormal:  The  Limitations  of 
Bracketing Approaches in Providing Neutral Accounts 
of Supernormal Claims 
 
Jeremy Northcote 
 
 
ABSTRACT  This  paper  contends  that  bracketing  approaches  to  the 
sociological study of supernatural, paranormal and occult proponents do not 
truly ‘bracket’ the reality-claims made by those being studied, but instead 
impose ontological limits on what can be considered ‘supernormal.’  It is 
argued  that  such  boundaries  and  definitions  tend  to  rule  out  alternative 
ontological  perspectives  of  the  kind  that  researchers  typically  encounter 
amongst religious, paranormal and occult proponents.  It is also argued that, 
unlike  earlier  reductionist  approaches  to  the  supernormal,  the  bias  of 
bracketing approaches is not necessarily based on an underlying sceptical 
outlook of researchers, but rather reflects an inherent ontological limitation 
within the sociological enterprise itself.  It is recommended that bracketing 
should be replaced by a reflexive, dialogical approach that emphasises the 
ontological  positioning  of  social  analyses  with  respect  to  supernormal 
claims. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For  many  years  social  analysts  investigating  religion,  the  occult  and  the 
paranormal  tended  to  be  sceptical  of  „supernormal‟  claims.    Investigators 
sometimes openly stated such scepticism in their accounts, but more often than 
not  their  scepticism  operated  in  a  more  subtle  manner,  taking  the  form of 
symbolic  or  functional perspectives that tended to (often implicitly) reduce 
supernormal conceptions purely to psychological or social constructs.  But in 
recent years researchers of the occult, the paranormal, religion and various 
„alternative‟  religions  have  increasingly  championed  the  notion  that  social 
analysts  can,  and  should,  avoid  taking  a  position  on  the  validity  of 
supernormal  ideas.    This  perspective  is  generally  referred  to  as  the 
„bracketing‟ approach. 
Despite the apparent progress made by recent social analysts in moving 
away from positioned accounts, I contend that current bracketing approaches, 
like  past  approaches,  do  not  offer  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  bias  in 
sociological  accounts  of  the  supernormal.    The  problem  is  that  bracketing 
approaches, which claim to only deal with the social aspects of religious and  
quasi-religious activities and leave the empirical validity of such activities an 
open question, inevitably make a demarcation between „social,‟ „physical‟ and 
„supernormal‟ reality that invalidates certain ontological claims (such as those 
that make little distinction between social, physical and paraphysical reality).  
However, I will argue that this bias is not necessarily a problem of analysts 
being unable to remain impartial (although this can sometimes be the case), 
but that, despite their best intentions, bias is built into the very assumptions 
that underlie social analysis itself.  I will contend that there is no easy way out 
of this dilemma, but that a more reflexive and dialogical approach can at least 
highlight  the  limits  of  impartiality  inherent  in  any  particular  analytical 
approach  and  acknowledge  alternative,  „emic‟  perspectives  concerning  the 
supernormal.   
 
 
From Sceptical Bias to Bracketing 
 
In  order  to  understand  the  bracketing  approach  and  its  limitations,  it  is 
necessary first to examine the more blatant „positioned‟ perspectives that the 
bracketing  approach  sought  to  replace.    Of  these  perspectives,  the  most 
dominant has been that of the „Humanist‟ social analysts who, in either an 
open  or  veiled  manner,  present  sceptical  accounts  of  supernormal  claims.
1  
The sceptical bias that such analysts exhibit towards the supernormal can be 
seen on the occasions when, having not ignored the area altogether or reduced 
it to a curious oddity, they adopt a general pattern of discrediting proponents 
of  such  ideas,  portraying  them  as  irr ational,  gullible,  fantasy  prone, 
pseudoscientific or downright fraudulent (Eglin, 1974: 324).   
Even the more sympathetic treatments of supernormal proponents have 
tended to be characterised by a reductionist tendency that treats supernormal 
ideas as purely social or psychological constructs without a basis in objective 
reality.  Such reductionist approaches have been common since the early days 
of  sociology  and  anthropology.    For  example,  nineteenth  century  social 
theorist Karl Marx regarded supernatural  ideas as a „false consciousness‟ – 
referring  to  them,  in  fact,  as  the  “opium  of the people” (1957[1844]: 42).  
Marx argued that the dominant class has long employed such ideas as tools of 
manipulation to subordinate the masses.  Another influential social theorist, 
Edward B. Tylor, saw modern-day beliefs in ghosts and other such phenomena 
as survivals of our primitive past, and held that people in our own society who 
believed in such things were just as irrational, ignorant, and childlike as the 
natives of less advanced cultures (1979[1873]).   
Although  the  cultural  relativism  that  emerged  in  the  field  of 
anthropology  in  the  1920s  and  1930s  signalled  a  shift  away  from  the  
application of these evolutionary perspectives to native peoples, supernormal 
proponents do not seem to have benefited from this new-found respect for 
traditional, non-Western, „spiritual‟ beliefs.  Perhaps the reason they did not 
benefit  was  because,  unlike  their  „native‟  contemporaries,  supernormal 
proponents were regarded as part of our own society, not of some foreign 
cultural system, and consequently they were expected to know better (Dolby, 
1979: 28).   
But even in their studies of non-Western societies, the impression one 
gets of most cultural relativists, even contemporary ones, is that their mode of 
analysis tends to undermine the supernormal truth-claims made by those being 
studied.    They  are  undermined  because  of  the  way  these  analysts  tend  to 
reduce  supernormal  ideas  to  entirely  symbolic,  structural  or  functional 
constructs,  thereby  giving  the  impression  that  such  claims  have  no  basis 
whatsoever in objective reality.
2   
Sociologist Peter Berger makes some insightful observations concerning 
the ontological bias evident in reductionist approaches, arguing that they 
provide  “quasiscientific  legitimations  of  a  secularized  world  view”  (1974: 
128).   He contends that functionalist explanations, for example, “flatten out” 
supernatural phenomena to the point that, 
 
…any  manifestations  of  transcendence  are,  strictly  speaking, 
meaningless, and therefore can only be dealt with in terms of social 
or psychological functions that can be understood without reference 
to transcendence (1974: 129). 
 
Berger  argues  that  functionalist  explanations  should  be  employed  only  in 
certain types of inquiry, such as in “investigations of the social-psychological 
mechanisms by which this or that worldview is maintained as plausible in the 
minds of its adherents” (1974: 128).  The application of such theories as total 
explanations  for  the  origin  and  nature  of  those  claims  is  in  Berger‟s  view 
illegitimate.  Instead, Berger calls for approaches that “bracket” such reality-
claims, leaving the question of their validity open within the account.  Berger 
asserts:  
 
The  scientific  study  of  religion  must  bracket  the  ultimate  truth 
claims  implied  by  its subject… Anyone engaged in the scientific 
study  of  religion  will  have  to  resign  himself  to  this  intrinsic 
limitation – regardless of whether, in his extrascientific existence, he 
is a believer, an atheist or a skeptic (1974: 125). 
  
Ideally, a bracketing approach does not make a judgement one way or the 
other about the ontological status of a supernormal claim, but simply presents 
a perspective on the phenomenon “from within” (Berger 1974: 129), that is, 
from the point of view of proponents.  Such an approach had earlier been 
recommended by anthropologist Edward Evans-Pritchard, who wrote: 
 
As  I  understand  the  matter,  there  is  no  possibility  of  knowing 
whether the spiritual beings of primitive religions or of any others 
have any existence or not, and since that is the case he cannot take 
the question into consideration...  It was precisely because so many 
anthropological writers did take up a theological position albeit a 
negative  and  implicit  one,  that  they  felt  that  an  explanation  of 
primitive religious phenomena in causal terms was required, going, 
it seems to me, beyond the legitimate bounds of the subject (1965: 
17).
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Social analyst Graham Watson also calls on analysts to “suspend judgment on 
the  status  of  informants‟  knowledge  claims”  with  respect  to  magical  and 
religious conceptions, lest we “find ourselves accounting for what we take to 
be our informants‟ true beliefs in terms of their correspondence to what we 
hold to be real” (1991: 83).
4  He warns: 
 
Our  anthropology  of  knowledge  would  then  become  merely  the 
anthropology  of  erroneous  belief,  while  the  work  done  in 
constituting  „true  knowledge‟  as  „true  knowledge‟  would  remain 
hidden from us (1991: 83). 
 
Watson  declares,  however,  that  this  position  “does  not  entail  judgmental 
relativism,” for the bracketing approach does not preclude the possibility that 
there  may  ultimately  be  either  an  empirical  or  non-empirical  basis  for 
informants‟ reality claims.
5  Instead the emphasis should be on the manner in 
which  participants  express  and  debate  those  claims  irrespective  of  their 
empirical basis.  
The call to bracket judgements about the truth or falsity of supernormal 
claims has been made by Andrew Greely (1975), Harry Collins and Trevor 
Pinch (1982: 184), and David Hess (1993), amongst others.  But there are 
inherent ontological biases in bracketing approaches that have not generally 
been acknowledged by analysts, which I shall now outline in some detail.   
 
 
  
The Limitations of Bracketing 
 
I hold that there is a fundamental bias in bracketing approaches that arises 
from the fact that an analyst taking such an approach must inevitably make a 
decision about where to place the „brackets,‟ and hence must define some 
aspects  of  supernormal  belief  or  activity  as  being  social  in  nature and the 
remainder as not, which is itself an ontological claim.  For example, Peter 
Berger declares: 
 
Whatever else these phenomena may be, they will also be human 
projections,  products  of  human  history,  social  constructions 
undertaken by human beings (emphasis his) (1990[1969]: 52).  
 
The  problem  here  lies  in  the  fact  that,  according  to  many  supernormal 
proponents, even the apparently socio-cultural aspect of supernormal related 
activities  are  ultimately  constituted  by  supernormal  factors.    For  example, 
during my research into the controversies that surround paranormal and occult 
ideas (see Northcote, 2001), many proponents told me that their interest in 
various supernormal phenomena had been shaped by supernormal experiences, 
and some even claimed that it was „guided‟ by supernormal forces.  Wicca 
enthusiasts, for example, sometimes cited a „calling‟ (usually via visions and 
dreams) from „the Goddess‟ who outlined their life‟s mission and in some 
cases granted them special powers.  One self-declared witch and medium told 
me: 
 
I had a dream where the spirit of the Goddess came to me and told 
me the purpose of my life.  This was at a major crisis in my life and 
became a great turning point for me.  I found out that my purpose in 
life is to help others and help in any way I can, and that is what I‟ve 
been doing ever since (quoted in Northcote, 2001: 138-39). 
 
The notion of „a calling‟ has a long tradition in Western Christianity, and has 
also  been  embraced  by  a  whole  range  of  alternative  religious  and  quasi-
religious proponents.  Some UFO enthusiasts also cite guidance (in their case, 
guidance by extraterrestrial beings) as being an important factor underlying 
their involvement in UFO research and influencing their life generally.  Indeed 
sociologist Charles Emmons notes that many ufologists “come to be aware 
that they are being chosen and perhaps directed by the UFO phenomenon” 
(1997: 68).    
Many  proponents  even  see  apparently  indisputable  „sociological‟ 
aspects of involvement such as social organisation and social status as being 
determined  or  manipulated  by  supernormal  forces.    Social  analysts,  for 
example,  are  familiar  with  the  claim  often  made  by  religious  and  quasi-
religious leaders that their authority and the organisational structure of their 
social groups have been divinely ordained.   Such claims are often employed 
to  justify  the  ecclesiastical  and  patriarchal  hierarchy  that  prevails  in  some 
established churches,
6 and also with the „charismatic‟ authority
7 held by some 
„sect‟ leaders and the segregated group structures they construct.
8  Similar 
notions concerning the divine foundation of social structures can be found 
amongst paranormal adherents.  For example, I have heard UFO proponents 
claim  that  the  growing  „movement‟  of  popular  interest  in  UFOs  is  being 
orchestrated by extraterrestrials in order to prepare the citizens of Earth for 
official  extraterrestrial  contact.    Similarly,  some  New  Agers  I  spoke  to 
believed that the burgeoning interest in spiritual ideas is the result of a general 
evolutionary  awakening  of  humankind‟s  „spiritual  consciousness.‟
9  
Meanwhile,  some  Christian  evangelists/fundamentalists  attributed  popular 
interest  in  spiritual  and  occult  matters  to  demonic  manipulation  –  part  of 
Satan‟s ongoing battle with God. 
Now an approach that demands that the ontological basis of claims be 
bracketed can run into trouble at this point, because such claims challenge the 
very notion that social processes are involved at all, or at least they challenge 
orthodox  social  scientists‟  views  that  distinguish  between  natural  (or 
supernatural)  processes  and  social  processes.    Consequently,  the  extent  to 
which  socio-cultural  factors  are  involved  itself  becomes  one  of  the 
„ontological‟ issues in dispute, and as such it too should rightly be bracketed.  
The problem here is not only that a bracketing approach generally fails 
to eliminate „clashes‟ between the analyst‟s perspective and the perspectives 
of those being studied, but it may also undermine the strength of the analysis 
by providing, at best, a very limited perspective and, at worse, one that has 
completely misrepresented the processes involved.  Consider, for example, the 
possibility that people‟s thinking and behaviour are indeed based on various 
supernormal forces, but that this factor has been bracketed out of the analysis.  
In  this  scenario  a  bracketing  approach  will  falsely  attribute  mundane 
sociological  explanations  to  behaviour  that  is  in  actuality  shaped  by 
supernormal  forces.    Alternatively  we  could  consider  the  possibility  that 
Skeptics are correct in identifying processes such as mass delusion, irrational 
tendencies and myth making as the basis of supernormal knowledge/belief.  In 
this scenario a bracketing approach will miss the elements of self-deception  
and/or „irrationality‟ that are involved in social processes related to belief in 
the supernormal.   
For  these  reasons  I  question  Collins  and  Pinch‟s  declaration  that  it 
“would make not one jot of difference to the analysis” (1982: 184) to know 
whether psychic phenomena are „real‟ or not.  Rather it seems to me that a 
bracketing  approach  does  make  particular  ontological  assumptions  about 
reality that fundamentally shape the analysis and often conflict with the claims 
made by those being studied.   
In general, I see such bias as unavoidable, for it is built into the very 
foundations  of  social  analysis.    The  heart  of  the  problem  lies  in  the  very 
demarcation  of  socio-psychological  reality  as  a  distinct  sphere  from  other 
kinds of reality - particularly from physical reality (Latour, 1993).  In fact it 
appears to be the case that intrinsic to any social analysis is the imposition of 
boundaries that define socio-psychological processes as distinct from natural-
physical processes (and certainly as distinct from any supposed „supernormal‟ 
processes).  The construction of ontological difference therefore lies at the 
heart of the social scientific enterprise.  Moreover, there is a fairly clear-cut 
division of labour that prevails in academia: natural reality is regarded as the 
province of the natural sciences, who are granted sole authority to define the 
attributes of the physical world; and what is not of nature is designated as the 
field of inquiry for the social sciences.
10  The only issue that seems to be in 
dispute with regard to this division is where natural rea lity ends and socio-
psychological reality begins.   
In most cases analysts have followed the lead of orthodox scientists in 
delineating the boundary between the natural and the social.  As sociologist 
Roy  Wallis  writes:  “Sociologists  maintained  a  deferential  attitude  towards 
prevailing scientific orthodoxy, accepting that in respect of the esoteric content 
of science, scientists knew best” (1979: 5).
11  This deference is reflected in the 
way that social scientists tend to treat established scientific ideas as „natural‟ 
and  supernormal  ideas  as  „social.‟      Hence  they  have  tended  to  exercise 
„selective  relativism‟  in  their  examination  of  supernormal  ideas.      With 
selective relativism only deviations from accepted knowledge are viewed as 
being socially constructed (and supernormal claims are usually seen to fit this 
category), whereas commonly accepted „facts‟ about reality - defined within a 
Western scientific framework - are not (Latour, 1993: 105; Brown, 1995: 7).  
Sociologist  Bruno  Latour  notes  this  relativistic  bias  in  past  analyses  of 
supernormal ideas when he remarks: 
  
It was certainly possible to analyze a belief in flying saucers, but not 
the  knowledge  of  black  holes;  we  could  analyze  the  illusions  of 
parapsychology, but not the knowledge of psychologists (1993: 92). 
 
Anthropologist  Greg  Myers  (1990)  is  critical  of  such  selective 
approaches.  He writes: 
 
One  should  use  the  same  modes  of  explanation  for  belief  in 
witchcraft or phrenology as for belief in electromagnetic waves or 
neuroendocrinology.    The  particular  explanations  behind  these 
beliefs  may,  of  course,  be  different,  but  one  can‟t  say,  in  this 
approach, that the nineteenth-century public believed in phrenology 
for  cultural  reasons,  whereas  we  believe  in  neuroendocrinology 
because it is true (1990: 20). 
 
As a consequence of the questionable nature of such selectivity, some 
analysts have begun to urge a more radical form of relativism that does not 
privilege  truth-claims  made  by  scientists  over  others.
12  Sociologists Harry 
Collins and Trevor Pinch (1982) can be considered the principal advocates of 
this approach to the sociology of the paranormal.  However, I would consider 
even their relativist position to constitute a distinct bias.  On the one hand, 
they make a significant concession to parapsycholo gists in their study by 
treating their experiments (or some of them at least) as scientific and rational - 
a bias that sociologists Michael Mulkay, Jonathan Potter and Steven Yearley 
(1983) have criticised Collins and Pinch for.  On the other hand, whateve r 
concession Collins and Pinch allow parapsychologists in terms of „scientific‟ 
status, they tend to take away when they argue that empirical reality has no 
bearing  on  the  content  and  form  of  scientific  ideas.    This  is  a  radical 
application of the „underdetermined thesis,‟ which holds that any number of 
interpretations of a single „fact‟ are possible (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983: 
3), and hence universal factors do not determine the interpretations that people 
make.
13 
The perception that relativist approaches  dismiss objective reality as a 
foundation  of  people‟s  knowledge,  prompted  one  paranormal 
enthusiast/academic  to  discourage  me  from  taking  a  „relativist‟  or 
„postmodern‟  approach  in  my  own  research  into  the  politics  surrounding 
paranormal  ideas  (Northcote,  2001).    Such  a  perspective,  he  claimed, 
undermined any notion of paranormal claims having an empirical validity.  The 
inference here seemed to be that he wanted paranormal ideas to be judged in 
the same way that scientific ideas are typically judged - that is, as empirically  
valid.  In other words, he did not want science to be demoted, but rather, 
paranormal research to be promoted.   
We can see, therefore, that attempts by relativist theorists to dismiss the 
influence  of  the  „natural  world‟  on  social  behaviour  altogether  does  not 
represent  a  significant  step  towards  constructing  a  „neutral‟  position  with 
regard to the study of supernormal ideas.  In fact, I have come to accept that 
“in  a  postconstructivist  world  there  are  no  neutral  positions”  (Hess,  1993: 
155).   
 
 
Towards a reflexive, dialogical account of the supernormal 
 
Given  my  contention  that  ontological  bias  is  unavoidable  in  bracketing 
approaches, we might wonder how social scientists who endeavour to present 
a  fair-minded  account  of  supernormal  ideas  can  proceed  in  such 
circumstances.  First, in my opinion it is possible for analysts to be both biased 
and fair-minded in their accounts, as long as other ontological possibilities 
(particularly those that accord with the views of the people being studied) are 
described and given their due respect.  In this way a balance can be achieved 
between emic perspectives and analysts‟ own positioned perspectives.  In fact, 
a  recognition  and  declaration  of  the  analyst‟s  lack  of  neutrality  and  the 
inclusion of alternative positions and voices is, in my opinion, not only the 
best course for the analyst to take in order to produce a fair-minded account of 
the people being studied, but it also helps analysts and readers alike to better 
understand the assumptions underlying the positions of both the analyst and 
those  being  studied.    What  is  required,  in  other  words,  is  the  exercise  of 
reflexivity through a dialogical approach to social inquiry.   
A reflexive approach to the study of paranormal enthusiasts is in fact 
precisely the path suggested by Hess, who proposes that the analyst‟s own 
position should be subject to the same degree of critical examination that the 
positions of enthusiasts themselves are subject to.   He states: 
 
I  am  advocating  a  form  of  reflexivity  that  goes  beyond  textual 
experimentation  to  a  critique  of  the  social,  cultural,  and  political 
assumptions of both the discourse of the Self and that of the Other 
(1993: 155). 
 
Hess argues that reflexivity must not be restricted to purely epistemological 
and representational issues, but must encompass “a critique of the political and 
ideological  assumptions  of  one‟s  own  discursive  community”  (1993:  156).  
The need to subject the analyst‟s own position to critical scrutiny relates, I  
contend, to two issues: first, that analysts themselves are embedded within 
academic discourses that, as I have argued, are prone to certain biases; and 
second, that analysts - indeed, the entire scientific enterprise - are part of the 
wider culture and, hence, subject to the same „cultural politics‟ as that which 
surrounds the controversy over supernormal ideas.
14 
The  importance  of  reflexivity  has  also  been  emphasised  by  social 
theorists such as Jurgen Habermas (1984) and Pierre Bourdieu (1977), who 
argue that through the exercise of reflexivity,
15 unquestioned „doxic‟ elements 
can  be  exposed.    These  theorists  proceed  to  the  erroneous  conclusion, 
however, that the influence of these unquestioned elements can be negated 
through bracketing.  Habermas, for example, talks of a “hypothetical approach 
to phenomena and experiences,” which are “isolated from the complexity of 
their life-world contexts and analyzed under experimentally varied conditions” 
(1985: 206-7).   But, as I have argued, it is naïve to think that any utterances 
can be isolated from the complexity of people‟s „life-world.‟  This is because 
life-world assumptions not only underlie the conceptual frameworks through 
which ideas are expressed, but also the implicit rules that govern reflective 
thought and even the desire to engage in reflection in the first place.   
Such are the realisations made by „Foucaultian‟ scholars, who focus on 
the way that all thought and practices - including self-critiques - are embedded 
in complex networks of knowledge and power (Foucault, 1980).  In fact, some 
theorists suggest that subtle, pre-existing biases and interests can obstruct a 
reflexive analysis to such a degree that analysts are not able to transcend their 
position in order to „objectively‟ examine their biases at all.  Steve Woolgar 
makes the point, for example, that the claims produced by a reflexive approach 
should rightly be subject to critique themselves, and so on, resulting in an 
“infinite regress” (1983: 254).   
But while I agree that it is not possible to transcend one‟s bias to the 
point of neutrality, I hold that it is possible to be sufficiently aware of one‟s 
bias - at least relationally (that is, in relation to other ideas) if not objectively - 
that  one  can  at  least  understand  the  limitations  of  one‟s  perspective.    By 
recognising  the  partiality  of  his/her  account  in  relation  to  alternative 
perspectives  in  this  manner,  the  analyst  can  stake  out  the  ontological 
assumptions  that  characterise  his/her  position  (as  much  as  their  reflexive 
capacity  allows),  and  then  proceed,  somewhat  experimentally,  with  what 
amounts to a positioned account.   
In my view, then, the main problem with the types of analyses discussed 
above is not that the analysts conducting them adopt certain biased positions, 
but  that  they  generally  fail  to  present  their  analysis  as  a  positioned  one.  
Instead,  the  implication  often  is  that  theirs  is  a  neutral  treatment  of  the  
supernormal  question.    A  declaration  of  one‟s  positioning,  however, 
constitutes the first step towards avoiding this problem, even if the study itself 
tends to undermine the ontological validity of participants‟ positions, or even 
makes moral judgements about those positions.  This is where reflexivity must 
be employed, not as a means of ridding social analysis of bias, but as a means 
of making the analyst‟s own position overt.  If such a „reflexive partiality‟ is 
employed,  the  analyst  should  ideally  be  able  to  construct  his/her  account 
without any hidden agenda or false pretensions.  
If all analytical positions are biased, however, and all that is required of 
analysts is that they make their biases as explicit as possible, does this mean 
that analysts can take any position they please?  Some analysts would answer 
in the affirmative.  Social analyst Daniel Hodges (1974), for example, goes so 
far as to advocate an approach that openly incorporates assumptions about the 
supernatural, either positive or negative, into the analysis.  Further, Hodges 
argues  that  the  inclusion  of  various  assumptions  in  the  analysis  serves  to 
generate new propositions about the nature of belief.   
Of  course,  there  will  be  those  who  reject  the  incorporation  of 
supernormal assumptions in social analysis.  Anthropologist Jacques Maquet, 
for example, writes: 
 
Anthropology  is  neither  a  spiritual  path,  nor  a  search  for 
nonordinary powers; it is a discursive discipline of knowledge.  The 
warrior‟s quest and the sorcerer‟s endeavour belong to other realms 
and thus cannot provide guidance for anthropology… (1978: 362). 
 
While  Maquet  seems  to  be  setting  limits  here  in  terms  of  where  the 
experimental  boundaries  of  social  analysis  lay,  to  me  this  seems  to  be  a 
somewhat arbitrary matter, although one that I will leave for others to debate.  
At any rate, in my opinion Hodges‟ argument is not so much a call for radical 
experimentalism  in  social  analysis  as  it  is  an  affirmation  of  what  analysis 
already  is  -  namely,  an  experimental  account  that  is  based  upon  certain 
ontological assumptions that the analyst has made.  I would stress, however, 
that  I  am  not  necessarily  advocating  that  social  analysts  incorporate 
supernormal or sceptical assumptions in their mode of analysis, but rather that 
they  understand  that  their  own  position  could  be  just  as  biased  and 
experimental as that taken by less „neutral‟ theorists.   
Recognising the „bias‟ of one‟s position is, however, only the first step 
in constructing a fair-minded account.  The second step is to acknowledge the 
viewpoints  of  „insiders‟ in the account.  This has the effect of putting the 
analyst‟s own position in perspective and providing some „balance‟ between  
the  analyst‟s  „etic‟  perspective  and  insiders‟  „emic‟  perspectives.    The 
inclusion  of  such  emic  perspectives  constitutes  the  „dialogical‟  aspect  of 
analysis.
16  
Precisely what social analysts mean by a „dialogical‟ account varies,
17 
and can be taken to indicate such aspects as: (1) the dialogical manner in 
which  data  is  gathered  (for  example,  discussions  and  interviews  with 
informants); (2) the dialogue between researcher and informants over the way 
in which data is collated and interpreted; (3) the dialogical form in which etic 
and emic views are presented in the account; and (4) the manner in which the 
final account „speaks‟ to different positions (in terms of the assumptions and 
judgements the analyst makes about his/her own position and those of others).  
A dialogical approach that incorporates these various aspects can go a long 
way towards presenting the kind of „balanced‟ account of the supernormal that 
I am recommending.   I will now explain these points in a little more detail. 
The  first  aspect  - concerning the dialogical manner in which data is 
gathered - is important because it can help illuminate the view “from within” 
(as Berger puts it), for it is generally through talking to people that the analyst 
comes to understand alternative points of view (although in saying this, I do 
not  mean  to  downplay the importance of other fieldwork methods such as 
participant-observation and the reading of folk narratives).  The second aspect 
–  concerning  the  dialogue  between  researcher  and  informant  over  the 
construction of the analysis – can be an important aid not only in the effective 
design  of  ethnographies,  surveys  and  other  research  genres  during  the 
methodological phase, but it can also aid in evaluating the analyst‟s findings 
from an insider perspective during the analytical phase.
18  The third aspect - 
concerning the dialogical form in which etic and emic views are presented 
within the account  -  is  important  in  terms  of  offsetting  the  analyst‟s  own 
position against the positions of those being studied, so that the reader can 
easily  discern  between  the  analyst‟s  etic  position  and  the  insider‟s  emic 
position.
19 
Before I address the fourth aspect of dialogical analysis, I would point 
out that I am fully aware that those social analysts who do not seek to explore 
„insider‟  views  on  the  supernormal  in  their  studies  might  question  the 
usefulness of incorporating the dialogical techniques outlined above.  This is 
where the fourth, more general, aspect of dialogical analysis has relevance, 
because  it  emphasises  the  way  that  all  accounts  intrinsically  „speak‟  to 
alternative perspectives, even if what the analyst is saying does not explicitly 
address those perspectives or is principally intended for proponents of those 
perspectives.  It is when the analyst is aware of this dialogical aspect of his/her 
account,  and  this  awareness  is  made  manifest  through  acknowledgment  of  
alternative perspectives (through the kinds of dialogical techniques outlined 
above),  that the account can be framed in a more open-ended, rather than 
definitive,  manner  -  or,  at  least,  this  is  how  the  account  will  tend  to  be 
interpreted by its readers.   
By acknowledging that alternative points of view exist, proponents are 
at least given some space for reply.  The provision for this space is particularly 
important  given  the  power  wielded  by  social  analysts,  whose  authority  in 
society – particularly in comparison to that held by many „fringe‟ proponents 
of supernormal ideas – is generally such that they can (and indeed, as I have 
indicated, often do) effectively invalidate the claims of proponents altogether.  
In a sense, then, I am suggesting that social analysts have a responsibility to at 
least  acknowledge  alternative  viewpoints  in  their  studies  because  of  the 
considerable authority that they hold in the wider society.  
 
  
Conclusion 
 
My main aim in this paper has been to examine the bias that has characterised 
social analyses of supernormal ideas.  I have argued that, due to the particular 
discursive orderings that underpin academic inquiry, most accounts produced 
by social analysts will inevitably reflect certain ontological biases and that 
even bracketing or relativist approaches are not immune to such problems.  
Given  these  difficulties,  I  have  recommended:  first,  that  analysts  construct 
their  positions  reflexively;  second,  that  they  represent  their  work  as  a 
positioned  experiment  rather  than  as  an  objective,  definitive  account;  and 
third, that they view their accounts as something of a dialogue with alternative 
positions  -  positions  that,  as  far  as  possible,  are  acknowledged  within  the 
account.  I contend that it is only when such steps are taken that supernormal 
claims can be fairly represented in an analysis.   
Precisely  how  the  recommendations  I  have  suggested  in  this  paper 
might  be  achieved  in  practice,  however,  is  something  that  requires  further 
discussion.  For example, how could even the best intentioned „dialogical‟ 
researcher take into account the multiplicity of perspectives that tend to exist 
on matters such as the supernormal, even within the confines of small groups 
or communities?  Another issue is how much space is reasonable to reserve 
within the account for a discussion of insider perspectives in order to give 
them a fair hearing (particularly if the study does not principally set out to 
explore such perspectives).   Is a paragraph or section in an article sufficient?  
Should a book set aside an entire chapter for this purpose?  
Clearly there are many issues to be considered regarding the manner in 
which,  and  the  extent  to  which,  a  reflexive,  dialogical  treatment  of  
supernormal perspectives might feature in analytical accounts.  However, the 
recommendations  I  have  put  forward  in  this  paper  should  serve  as  useful 
guidelines to the manner in which social analysts can go about constructing 
their accounts so that some form of inclusive dialogue can be achieved.   
As I have indicated in my discussion, the advantages of taking such an 
approach lie not only in the extension of charity to supernormal proponents, 
but also in the improved understanding it should give analysts regarding the 
ontological limits of the social scientific enterprise more generally.  Indeed, I 
hold that the understanding that can be gained from such an approach has 
broad relevance to all facets of social inquiry and not just those areas dealing 
with supernormal ideas, for it can help illuminate the modus operandi upon 
which all social analysts engage their subject matter.   
In this respect, it is important to realise that the issues I have discussed 
here are not unique to the study of supernormal claims, for the problems of 
dealing  fairly  and  accurately  with  emic  perspectives,  and  defining  the 
relationship of social inquiry to „ultimate reality,‟ are two of the central issues 
that social analysts must deal with whatever their area of study.  Yet the areas 
of religion, the occult and the paranormal present a particularly clear platform 
for addressing these issues, for they are arenas where some of the most basic 
„truths‟ that underlie Western thought (including the social scientific enterprise 
itself) are contested in a relatively „raw‟ fashion.  They are arenas, therefore, 
that  can  expose  the  limits  and  excesses  of  knowledge-claims  in  a  most 
transparent manner.   
Rather than shying away from these thorny issues then, social analysts 
studying  supernormal  claims  could  take  the  opportunity  to  enrich  their 
analyses through an active engagement with these issues, even if they risk 
undermining the foundations of their own inquiry.  Recognising that social 
analysis is fundamentally dialogical in character rather than a „neutral‟ inquiry 
represents, I contend, the first step towards such an engagement. 
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NOTES: 
                                                        
1 Examples of „open‟ scepticism can be seen in the work of Marvin Harris (1974) and James Lett (1991).  
                                                                                                                                                                       
2 A good recent example of such reductionism is the sociological account of crashed saucer beliefs by Saler, 
Ziegler and Moore (1997).  See Northcote (1999). 
3  This is in contrast to some sceptical comments Evans -Pritchard made earlier in his career in  his 
(1976[1937]) study, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande, in which he stated, “Witches, as 
Azande conceive them, cannot exist” (1976:18).  As anthropologist Basil Sansom suggested to me at an 
ethnographic forum (Fremantle, Perth, May 1998) where I presented an early draft of this paper, Evans-
Pritchard‟s earlier work on Azande magical and supernatural beliefs may have been influenced by the more 
atheistic  Oxford  school,  while  his  later  work  on  Nuer  religion  (1956)  came  under  the  influence  of 
Robertson-Smith and the divinity scholars at Cambridge, who held that primitive beliefs were „refractions 
of divinity‟ (Sansom 1998:personal communication). 
4  Watson  uses  the  example  of  the  Azande‟s belief in witchcraft, which Evans-Pritchard studied in his 
famous (1976) monograph, Witchcraft, Oracles & Magic among the Azande.  In his discussion, Watson 
makes the telling point that: “To the Azande, witches are as real as express trains are to me” (1991: 83). 
5 „Judgmental relativism‟ is to be understood in contrast to „epistemic relativism,‟ which sociologists Karin 
Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay distinguish as follows: “Epistemic relativism asserts that knowledge is 
rooted in a particular time and culture. …On the other hand, judgmental relativism appears to make the 
additional claims that all forms of knowledge are „equally valid,‟ and that we cannot compare different 
forms of knowledge and discriminate among them” (1983: 5). 
6 See, for example, the defence mounted by the National Conference of Catholic Bis hops (1987) against 
criticism of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Catholic Church.  The „headship‟ exercised by bishops is, 
they claim, consistent with (and is in fact directly descended from) the authority Jesus Christ gave to his 
apostles. 
7 Max Weber defines „charismatic authority‟ as the authority recognised in leaders who are seen to be 
“holders of special gifts of the body and spirit” – gifts that are “believed to be supernatural, not accessible 
to everybody” (1991: 245).   
8 The authority that sectarian leaders possess can also be validated in a more direct manner by alleged 
supernormal factors.  It may be proclaimed, for example, by a particular revelation, message or prophecy.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
9 This perspective is one of the central ideas developed in James Redfield‟s (1994) best-selling „New Age‟ 
novel, The Celestine Prophecy. 
10 As sociologist Barry Barnes puts it, “Culture can explain only what nature does not explain” (1983: 34). 
11 Wallis adds: “To question the „scientific method‟ was to undermine the foundation upon which one‟s 
own argument was built” (1979: 5). 
12 Such a perspective has become more tenable in recent decades, partly as a result of the doubt cast on the 
positivistic basis of scientific knowledge by philosophers such as Popper, Lakatos and, more vigorously, by 
Kuhn and Feyerabend (Wallis, 1979; Dolby, 1979). 
13 Less radical applications of the underdetermined thesis propose that „facts‟ do influence interpretation to 
some  degree,  but  are  still  culturally  mediated.    As  such,  although  they  will  produce  different 
interpretations, they will not be ones that are independent of an external reality.  Social analyst Sergio 
Sismondo (1996: 108) refers to this less radical approach as „perspectivalism.‟ 
14  Similarly, social analyst Michel -Rolph Trouillot has a rgued:  “I  contend  that  the  internal  tropes  of 
anthropology matter much less than the larger discursive field within which anthropology operates and 
upon whose existence it is premised.  A cultural critique of anthropology requires a historicization of that 
entire field” (1991: 17). 
15  The notion of reflexivity that Habermas has in mind here is one that is intersubjectively produced 
through mutual critique, in contrast to the Kantian notion of self -reflection exercised by the individual (see 
Habermas, 1974: 144-5). 
16  In  fact,  social  theorist  Jurgen  Habermas  argues  that  it  is  only  through  dialogue  or  “communicative 
action” that reflexive insight can be achieved (1974: 144-5). 
17 See, for example, Dennis Tedlock (1979), James Clifford (1983) and Elaine Lawless (1 992) for various 
formulations of what constitutes a „dialogical‟ mode of social analysis. 
18 Such a dialogue between researcher and informant has been recommended by ethnographers such as Jeff 
Titon (1988), Elaine Lawless (1992), Joke Schrijvers (1995) and Luke Lassiter (2001).  Elaine Lawless, for 
example,  remarks  that  she  came  to  value  such  an  approach  after  experiencing  some  fundamental 
disagreements with one of her informants over certain key interpretations in her study, Handmaidens of the 
Lord:  Pentecostal  Women  Preachers  and  Traditional  Religion  (1988).    In  one  disagreement  that  is  
                                                                                                                                                                       
particularly relevant to the present discussion, Lawless concluded that her informant, a female preacher, 
had  a  great  deal  of  inner  strength  that  Lawless  attributed  to  personal  factors.    This  contradicted  her 
informant‟s claim that her strength derived from God – a claim that the feminist-oriented Lawless viewed 
as “self-denial” (Lawless, 1992: 304). 
19  I have left the question open here of whether such a dialogical format sho uld reproduce an actual, 
„historical‟  dialogue  between  the  analyst  and  his/her  informants  (as  recommended by Dennis Tedlock, 
1979), or whether it should offer an „improvised‟ dialogue involving a plurality of voices that aims to evoke 
rather  than  to  represent  (as  recommended  by Stephen Tyler, 1987).  The debate over which format is 
preferable largely revolves around the issue of whether or not ethnographic writing can validly function as 
a form of „mimesis‟ (see Pool, 1991). 
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